

24 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Knoche

SUBJECT: Some Ideas

The following is in response to the Director's request to the Deputies to submit ideas that may be helpful to him in suggesting improvements or new arrangements for the Intelligence Community and for CIA.

1. First, in reading over the "authorizing legislation" for the Commission and the Congressional Committees, it is apparent that the emphasis is on establishing oversight and control in a futuristic framework.

2. To an old public administrator, control translates to requiring the Intelligence Community to adhere as closely as possible to the normalized procedures of other government agencies. Within those normalized procedures, however, modalities can be worked out to preserve the necessary protection of sources and methods. For example, CIA accepts almost to a 100%, the audit control principles established by Defense and the General Accounting Office. Yet we have been reluctant to invite the Congressional arm to establish a normal audit procedure similar to the practices in other agencies under groundrules which could be within the control of the DCI and our special Congressional Committees. We operate essentially under classifications systems of the Civil Service Commission but we have given very little publicity to that fact nor do we report openly as other agencies do. Given the Freedom of Information Act, that kind of reporting to a special section of the Civil Service Commission could probably be arranged with little loss of flexibility but with what appeared to be a modicum of control. We have never tried to submit to the President a classified annex to the budget. Such an annex could be developed and submitted to the same committees of Congress that we now report to and in a similar vein to that employed by the NSA, the Air Force, and others. I am not suggesting that we do any of these things. My message is that we need to review what we do and determine whether the Director might want to suggest giving more adherence to normalized

public administration practices but within special arrangements made within the appropriate committees of Congress. This is particularly important when one appreciates that the Committee is in a position to ask GAO to do it anyway, for example, and we are on record as saying we will abide by whatever arrangement Congress sees fit.

3. This brings me to a second category of matters. The visibility given to the specific Agency charge in the form of DCID's, NSCID's, etc. has been classified. We in the Intelligence Community Staff are reasonably convinced that there ought to be a way to prepare an executive order strengthening the Director's authority over the Community and delineating specific responsibilities of the national entities - CIA, NSA, etc. It seems to me that once one goes into the public record, i.e., the Federal Register, with its responsibilities through the executive order and basic laws clearly available, then legislation with respect to the protection of sources and methods can stand on its own merits and not mingle under the cloud of these other suspicions (perceptions).

4. Lastly, with respect to the next eight months, it is probably useful to have somebody draw from the Director's public statements and presentations a clear pattern of his objectives in treating with the intelligence problem. The patterns and the objectives are already being detected and commented upon by the press, and favorably. Yet somehow I feel that an expression of them in a precise way to the Community could be useful. One needs to appreciate, however, that once objectives are established, it does limit flexibility and sometimes can be politically unhelpful. With respect to intelligence management any sensible over-seeing committee will soon perceive that we have too much of it. The post-mortems on Cyprus and the Middle East demonstrate a certain degree of mind-set and constipation. The abundance of information tends to dilute perceptive analysis and that problem needs to be addressed. The Director is trying to do that and somehow the overseeing committees who will react to the current Community structure and size of its management team, I believe, must understand the subtle changes that have been occurring and the overall strategy involved. If that message can get across, I am convinced they will support executive orders or legislation or whatever in their own way to strengthen the progress Bill has already made in these few short months. One way to highlight this is to develop some charts which compare and contrast a) our intelligence to the other fellow's; b) our intelligence today versus 10 years ago; the projected intelligence capabilities versus no growth, etc.

5. In dealing with these Committees we are dealing with individuals who have a variety of biases and for the most part a historical record of their behavior and perceptions. If we were analyzing the same condition occurring in a Soviet scene, we would begin to employ analytic methodologies that would help us to forecast the likely patterns and results of the inquiries. Today we are responding in a normal, intuitive mode, hierarchical in approach and without any standback analysis to speak of. Time doesn't seem to permit much of this, but disjointed incrementalism will not be very helpful if we are trying to give the Director some ideas about what the intelligence activities of this government in 1985 should have by way of license. I believe it is important that the Director issue a perspective very shortly which can also be made available to the committees of Congress and in which the managerial actions required can be fairly well articulated in the guise of an internal intelligence community guideline. A careful review of this document, if written well, might trigger some interesting innovative and supportive Congressional response.



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